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ABSTRACT 
The idea that we are passive victims of our emotions, that they are wild and 
uncontrollable things which just happen to (or "in") us is very common . 
Robert Solomon thinks that this idea stems from a faulty philosophical 
analysis : the analysis that emotions are a kind of "feeling" or physiological 
happening . On this analysis , "feelings" and occurrences are externally 
caused ; as such they are non-rational and involuntary, the types of things 
that we cannot be held responsible for. In his seminal article "Emotions and 
Choice," Solomon opposes this view. He wants to show that we can be held 
accountable for our emotions, even praised or blamed for having them. To 
achieve this end , he shows that emotions are rational events, and hence are 
importantly conceptual events. Taken to its logical conclusion , Solomon 
proposes that emotions are judgments. That explains, in a way in which the 
traditional view can't explain , why emotions are subject to rational control and 
conscious manipulation , and therefore why we can rightly be held 
accountable for them. 
In this thesis I agree with Solomon that the intentionality of emotions cannot 
be accounted for by a "Components" model. What I don't agree with is that 
emotions are inferior judgments. If emotions really are a species of judgment 
(and I see no reason why the reverse might not be true, that judgments are a 
kind of emotion), then Solomon has given no adequate reason for his implicit 
view that emotions are inferior judgments. When we look more closely at 
Soloman's view of judgments, we see that he wobbles between a non-
componential and a componential analysis. Since it is his thesis that 
emotions are importantly non-componential , and that emotions are 
judgments, this wobbliness jeopardises Soloman's entire philosophical 
project. 
After examining the second half of "Emotions and Choice", I conclude that 
Soloman's strongest reason for thinking emotions are inferior judgments 
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really has nothing to do with the nature of judgments at all . It is because 
he is covertly, and maybe unwittingly, holding a view of emotions as self-
deceptions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
"Struck by jealousy", "driven by anger", "plagued 
by remorse" , "paralysed by fear" , "felled by 
shame", like "the prick of Cupid's arrow", are all 
symptomatic metaphors betraying a faulty 
philosophical analysis ."1 
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A prevailing view of emotions is that they are wild and uncontrollable, and 
that their occurrence is unintentional and involuntary. In everyday discourse, 
we speak of being "swept away" by emotions. We talk of those who let their 
emotions "get the best of them", of times when we are "under the influence" 
of our emotion . When we speak in these terms, we are expressing a view of 
the emotions as being beyond rationality. 
This is possibly a legacy of the Freudian view of emotions which made them 
out to be overwhelmingly potent, non-rational forces which lurked below or 
beyond the rational mind. As such , emotions were not thought to readily 
submit either to rational analysis or to conscious manipulation. In opposition 
to such powerful forces, man's conscious ego, his rational self, was seen as 
a frail and fragile opponent. 
This picture of emotions as "happening to (or "in") us" has consequences for 
our understanding of accountability and individual responsibility. Although we 
are generally required to attempt to control emotional expression (to "get a 
1 p251 "Emotions and Choice," Robert Soloman, 1980 in "Explaining Emotions" by Amelie 
Rorty 
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grip" on ourselves or "stop feeling sorry" for ourselves), our emotions are 
traditionally conceptualized as resisting our attempts to do so. If emotions are 
"occurrences" which we but helplessly observe, then rational analysis and 
conscious manipulation of them is severely challenged. And so is our 
responsibility for them , for we cannot be held accountable for things which 
merely happen to us. This is the view that Robert Soloman is objecting to in 
his article "Emotions and Choice". 
A second reason Soloman has for writing "Emotions and Choice" is a 
reaction against the now classic account of the intentionality of emotions 
suggested by Anthony Kenny in his Action, Emotion and Will. Kenny 
proposes that emotions are a species of "feelings," and then is forced to face 
the problem of how such feelings can be "about" the things emotions are so 
obviously about. (In contradistinction from other feelings which are only 
occurrences, Kenny wants to construct a story of "aboutness," by assuming 
that emotions are a sort of a compound involving a "cognitive" component 
tacked on to a "feeling" component.) Unwittingly, then Kenny has thereby 
affirmed the traditional split between cognition and emotion. And this split 
between reason and emotion is what Soloman vehemently opposes. 
In attacking Kenny's analysis of intentional feelings, Soloman attacks the 
notion that "feelings" and physiology could be "components" in an intentional 
relation . In the first place, Soloman tries to show how "feelings" are the wrong 
sorts of items to be "about" anything. In the second place, he tries to show 
that an intentional relation i.e. a conceptual relation, cannot involve two 
separate or separable components. Instead the intentional act and the · 
intentional object must be "essentially correlated ." Importantly, this improved 
account of "intentional" as involving the "essential correlation" of emotion 
and object, means that emotions must partake in conceptual relations in a 
way that mere occurrences, feelings or facts do not. 
To account for the fact that emotions are intentional in this new improved 
sense, Soloman rejects Kenny's claim that emotions are a species of feelings 
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and insists that emotions are a species of judgments. He is capitalising on 
the fact that if emotions and their objects are "essentially correlated" then we 
necessarily have some input into those objects. They are not externally 
caused objects. In a very real sense, we create them. This makes Soloman 
think that emotions can be rational in the same way in which judgments can 
be rational. He is thinking that we make judgments, and that this provides an 
exact parallel for our making our emotions. 
Unfortunately, Soloman has classed emotions as an inferior kind of 
judgment. Although he does not actually come out and say as much, his view 
of emotions is made very plain through his use of disparaging descriptions for 
emotions. They are as "myopic," "blind," "hasty," "rash" and the like. In 
addition to his argument for emotions being rational , in the sense of being 
non-occurrences, Soloman wants at the same time, to affirm the picture of 
emotions as irrational , i.e. as being "counter-productive and embarrassing to 
us, detours away from our aspirations .and obstacles blocking our 
ambitions"2. He is unaware that this picture of emotions as inferior 
judgments , must be underscored by a "components" picture of judgments. 
This fact jeopardises his whole attempt to advance on Kenny. Kenny, after 
all , had a "components" picture of emotions, and this, according to Soloman 
was supposed to be his Big Mistake. 
The above is an account mostly of the first half of "Emotions and Choice." In 
the second half of Soloman's article, something very different is happening. 
We begin to see what is driving this picture of emotions as inferior 
judgments. It is his picture of emotions as "irrational. " Emotions are 
supposed to be typically irrational, because they are "ready candidates for 
self-deception." Emotions are "devious," in the sense that they hide our true, 
self-serving, motivations. By his examples and his theory, it now seems that 
Soloman agrees with Freud after all, that the true wellspring of human 
motivations is a seething caldron of irrational, bestial impulses, and that such 
2 p 264" Emotions and Choice" (1980) 
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motivations often operate "deviously", i.e. outside of conscious control. 
Soloman agrees with Freud about these "irrational motivations," only he 
disagrees with Freud that such motivations are non-rational (in the sense of 
being caused occurrences). They are really rational , according to Soloman, 
in the sense of being "ours" (our cognitions , our creations). 
Two consequences of this view of emotions as rational, are important to 
Soloman. Firstly, it allows him to think that it always makes sense, at least 
(as it does not for headaches, heart attacks, and hormones) to praise or 
blame a person for having the emotion itself. Secondly, it makes him think 
that emotions are accessible to our other judgments (not inaccessible to our 
opinions, as occurrences are) . This fact can be explained by emotions 
themselves being judgments. Emotions, then are subject to rational control 
and conscious manipulation and this means that we can be held responsible 
for them. 
Philosophically speaking , the identification of emotions as "rational" (as 
opposed to non-rational) is very significant. But even more important, 
Soloman th inks that holding this "correct" philosophical analysis will make a 
difference as to how we behave around our emotions, in our daily practice. 
Realizing philosophically that emotions are ours (our cognitions) will mean, 
realizing practically, that we are all the while choosing our emotions. This 
realization is supposed to be a self-confirming hypothesis: it will make 
emotions our choices. 
In Chapter 6, I try to show how heavily Soloman is influenced by a picture of 
emotions as being typically irrational, devious, malicious, or uncivilized. At 
this point, Soloman's similarities to Freud are far more apparent than his 
dissimilarities. Soloman has a different explanation to Freud, for why such 
(unacceptable) emotions "dissolve" on contact with the conscious mind. 
Freud's explanation for this phenomenon was a causal one: what occurred 
when previously unconscious material emerged into consciousness is a kind 
of "catharsis of repressed emotional air bubbles". Soloman's explanation is 
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that emotions are "defused" by bringing them to conscious awareness 
because they are conceptual items and must partake in conceptual relations 
(such as the "pragmatic paradoxes" that have long been celebrated 
regarding judgments in general.) This mechanism aside, however, Soloman 
presents a remarkably similar picture to the Freudian one, in the sense that 
he has tagged emotions as unavailable to consciousness (at least he has 
tagged the "real" purpose of the emotion as unavailable) . Indeed, not only 
are they unavailable to consciousness, but they are deliberately 
i.e.(maliciously) unavailable to consciousness , and it is supposed to be a 
characteristic of them that they are so unavailable! This makes me wonder 
whether Soloman, in adopting a story of emotions as self-deceptions, hasn't 
created more of a Freudian monster than he has destroyed. I would like to 
have explored this idea further, however, all that I was able to do in Chapter 
6 was demonstrate how deeply influential this picture of the self-deception 
of emotions was on Soloman. 
As a psychotherapist, I think Soloman's view of emotions as self-deceptive is 
a very strange one. It is an extremely negative view of emotions and I think 
that his recommendations for how we are to regard our emotions are 
unworkable, even destructive. Certainly to take the attitude that it always 
makes sense to ask "what is motivating that emotion?" would be therapeutic 
suicide, when what that question really means is "what kind of deviousness is 
operating here?" I hope very briefly in chapter 9 to indicate why I think this 
is wrong and present my own view of emotions as rich and valuable sources 
of self-disclosure. 
